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COMMENTARY: BRADY FROM THE
PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Steven M Dettelbacht
I would like to provide a prosecution perspective on Brady, even
though I am now a defense attorney. I want to thank Case for having
this program and for having me, and I want to thank Professor
Giannelli for his upcoming and past work on this topic. As a member
of this local community, I take pride when I see somebody from
Cleveland play such an important role in an important debate. We
have a few such people in the debate of DNA and exonerating
evidence, including Professor Giannelli and my partner Jim Wooley.
Cleveland really can be proud of itself.
I am very conscious of the fact that I am talking to an audience of
experts. What I hope I can do is give you a different perspective, and
it is admittedly limited. Although I am now a defense attorney, I
come from many years as a federal prosecutor.
I don't know that I can talk with expertise about every prosecutor's
office. They are all different, but I will give you what I learned in my
years as a federal prosecutor. I will try to apply my experience to
Professor Giannelli's proposal that we need additional objective
discovery rules to handle Brady evidence.
There are three things I remember learning as a prosecutor related
to the issue of exculpatory evidence.
First, on almost my first day as a prosecutor in Washington D.C., a
very senior appellate prosecutor came in and lectured to all the baby
prosecutors on Brady. The first thing he said stuck with me for all
these years, and I will clean it up a little bit for this audience.
The senior prosecutor said "When you learn about a piece of the
evidence, if you say, 'Oh, heck,' then it is Brady." And he followed it
up by-and I will clean this up a little bit, too--"There is no case and
no criminal that is worth your integrity and your career," which is a
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unique and compelling way to explain to prosecutors, in their own
terms, in their own language, the necessity of complying with the
requirements of Brady.
Second, my personal experience was that prosecutors actually felt
the fear of personal consequences in making these decisions. I think
that often led to open file discovery and going beyond what the rules
require in certain jurisdictions.
Third, I still remember reading a memo by Stephen Trott that is
lore in the Department of Justice and is pounded into every young
Department of Justice prosecutor. Stephen Trott, who was the head
of the Criminal Division and later became a judge on the Ninth
Circuit, wrote a memorandum concerning the use of informants and
cooperating witnesses. The two lessons from the memorandum that
every prosecutor is taught: One. Don't do it unless you have to. Two.
Corroborate, corroborate, corroborate. From a prosecutor's
perspective, you never want to have any necessary part of your case
depend upon the credibility of a cooperator alone.
Those are three overview points that provide a prosecutor's
perspective on these issues.
I think it is also worth talking about the defense perspective and
how we got to this state of affairs in the law. We ought to examine
what caused the development of the materiality requirement, which
we heard about from the first panel and Professor Giannelli.
Specifically, we heard that the materiality requirement is a very strict
requirement and narrows Brady significantly.
There is actually a tension between today's panels on this issue-
we are hearing on the current panel that we have to get rid of the
materiality requirement, but we heard on the first panel that the
narrowness of the materiality requirement is why we feel comfortable
imposing a Brady rule on plea negotiations. So there must be some
reconciliation of the issue.
I think part of the reason for the materiality requirement is a self-
defense mechanism on the part of the criminal justice defend against
very talented and creative pool of defense attorneys. This is what
happens in many cases, and I think this is every prosecutor's worst
nightmare. They try a case. They try to do the right thing. They try to
make these discovery decisions. They get a conviction, and
afterwards the case is scrutinized under a microscope, in the view of
perfect hindsight, with incredibly creative and aggressive defense
attorneys making arguments about why things were exculpatory or
relevant to the trial, when in reality the trial was about totally
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different matters. Again, this is the prosecutor's perspective, but
that's the fear.
Moreover, I think this fear is shared by courts. I think courts have
developed this materiality requirement in order to serve as a self-
defense mechanism and to protect from second guessing rightful
convictions. I don't think anybody is claiming that in the scheme of
the criminal justice system, one hundred and ninety-four or even
nineteen thousand is the majority or even a significant proportion of
criminal convictions over the last twenty years. And as a self-defense
mechanism, unfortunately, we have had a narrowing of the Brady rule
by this materiality requirement to prevent against the kind of armchair
quarterbacking and second guessing that gives no finality in the
criminal justice system. That's not to say it is right, but I believe that
is how we got to where we are now.
We live in a constitutional system, but it is also a democracy. And
I think in the long run, the vast majority of people, of voters, want to
have reliable enforcement and reliable consequences to define
criminal conduct. So it is a difficult balancing act that we are doing
here between a defendants rights and the will of the majority to
impose sanctions on criminal conduct.
Those are general overview comments. But I want to get to
Professor Giannelli's point in his upcoming piece, which is whether
or not there should be additional specific rules of discovery that help
us thread this needle. I think there should be such rules, because there
is no way in a system with human beings that you can rely totally on
subjective determinations.
The more objectivity that we get in the system, the better. But I
have a caveat to Professor Giannelli's proposal, which is that there
has to be a balancing. I think that the imposition of these rules, then,
has to come with a presumption that somehow limits the ability to
make post hoc challenges based on novel theories when the rules
themselves have been complied with. So if the prosecutor follows the
rules and does all the things required by such rules-even though it
might not be constitutionally required in certain cases-then we ought
to reward that conduct by limiting the second guessing that goes on
after the fact.
There is a model for this: the Jencks Act. With the Jencks Act, we
addressed what we should do with prior statements. We have said it is
too messy for a prosecutor to figure out if the prior statement of a
witness is somehow impeachable, whether it is perfectly consistent
with the trial testimony or not. The prosecutor, therefore, has to give
all of the statements over to the defense.
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But the rule also comes with certain mechanical restrictions:
timing for the release of Jencks statements may differ from what the
defense counsel might want, or the uses of a statement might be
limited in certain circumstances. There is also litigation about what
constitutes a prior statement that is covered by the act and what
doesn't. Are summaries covered? In some places they are covered;
other places they are not. But if prosecutors follow the written rules,
they have some comfort that they will not somehow be punished later
for failing to produce certain material.
This model can be applied to Brady material. It might not be a
perfect model, but it is a model that rewards good behavior based
upon defined rules. I think we ought to consider doing that.
I don't think that as a political matter-and this is coming from my
experience as counsel on the Senate Judiciary Committee-we are
going to get to 'yes' by simply forcing a series of what will be viewed
as pro-defense rules down the mouth of the Department of Justice and
the community.
I don't think that's going to happen because it isn't a political
possibility given the general community's feeling about crime. The
community is rightfully schizophrenic on this issue. They hate it
when a guilty person is acquitted, but they also hate it when an
innocent person is convicted. We have to be careful about the
balance.
One of the things I fault both the Justice Department and the ABA
for is that neither has truly created an inclusive group to make this
balancing happen. To be fair, it is hard. We tried to create an
inclusive group a few years ago around the issue of contacts with
represented persons. We found that it is very, very hard to get the
people in the room talking to each other. That's why I think that these
kinds of conferences and these kinds of dialogues are so very
important. You cannot get to a solution that makes sense unless you
get buy-in from all the different communities involved.
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